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Abstract— This paper analyzes the asymptotic behavior of a
multiple-access network comprising a large number of selfish
transmitters competing for access to a common wireless com-
munication channel, and having different utility functions for
determining their strategies. A necessary and sufficient condition
is given for the total number of packet arrivals from selfish
transmitters to converge in distribution. The asymptotic packet
arrival distribution at Nash equilibrium is shown to be a
mixture of a Poisson distribution and finitely many Bernoulli
distributions.
I. INTRODUCTION
To investigate the behavior of a multiple-access communica-
tion network consisting of large number of selfish transmitters,
we consider the network model depicted in Fig. 1. In Fig.
1, each transmitter in the transmitter set has an intended
receiver in the receiver set. In the context of cellular networks,
the transmitter set consists of mobile users requesting uplink
reservations to communicate with a base station. In a more
general setting, it can be thought of as containing some number
of wireless transmitters that are closely located in a wireless
ad-hoc network, and that are willing to communicate with
another close-by node. The results in this paper can be viewed
as characterizing the local behavior of dense wireless networks
containing selfish nodes and using a collision channel model at
the medium access control (MAC) layer. The collision channel
model has been extensively used in the past (e.g., [1], [2]),
and it is used to characterize the behavior of networks using
no power control and containing nodes with single packet
detection capabilities. The protocol model defined in [3] is
a variation of the collision model.
A. Game Definition
We assume that transmitter nodes always have packets
to transmit, and a transmission fails if there is more than
one transmission at the same time. The cost of unsuccessful
transmission of node i is ci ∈ (0,∞). A likely meaning
that can be attributed to ci’s is the useless power expenditure
caused by failed packets. If a transmission is successful, the
node that transmitted its packet successfully gets a normalized
utility of 1 unit. We model this situation by using a strategic
game G(n, c), which is defined formally as follows:
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Fig. 1. Network model in which n selfish transmitters contend for the
access of a common wireless communication channel to communicate with
their intended receivers in the receiver set.
Definition 1: A heterogenous one-shot random access
game with n transmitter nodes is the game G(n, c) =
〈N , (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N 〉 such that N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the
set of transmitters, Ai = {0, 1} for all i ∈ N , where Ai
is the set of actions for node i and 1 means transmission
and 0 means back-off, c = (ci)i∈N where ci is the cost of
unsuccessful transmission for node i, and the utility function
ui for all i ∈ N is defined as:
ui(a) = 0 if ai = 0,
ui(a) = 1 if ‖a‖l1 = 1 and ai = 1,
ui(a) = −ci if ‖a‖l1 ≥ 2 and ai = 1.
In Definition 1, ‖·‖l1 denotes the l1 norm for vectors in Rn,
and is thus the sum of the absolute values of the components
of a vector. If ci = c > 0 for all i ∈ N , then we will denote
G(n, c) by G(n, c), and call it a homogenous one-shot random
access game.
B. A Note on Notation
Po(λ) and Bern(p) will indicate a Poisson distribution
with mean λ and a 0-1 Bernoulli distribution with mean p,
respectively, as well as the generic random variables with these
distributions. For any given two discrete distributions µ and
ν on the set of integers Z, dV (µ, ν) denotes the variational
distance between them, which is defined as dV (µ, ν) =∑
z∈Z |µ(z) − ν(z)|. If X and Y are random variables with
distributions µ and ν, we sometimes write dV (X,Y ) in stead
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2of dV (µ, ν) for ease of understanding. If one of the arguments
of dV contains a summation of some random variables, this
refers to the convolution of their respective distributions.
If a sequence of probability distributions {µn}∞n=1 con-
verges (in the usual sense of convergence in distribution) to
another probability distribution µ, we represent this conver-
gence by µn ⇒ µ as n→∞.
As in standard terminology, we call a Nash equilibrium a
fully-mixed Nash equilibrium (FMNE) if all of the transmitters
transmit with some positive probability in (0, 1) at this equilib-
rium. We call a Nash equilibrium a pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium if all transmitters choose their actions deterministically.
Therefore, any given transmitter i ∈ N either transmits or
backs-off with probability one at a pure strategy equilibrium.
X
(n)
i is the 0-1 random variable showing the action chosen
by transmitter i ∈ N when the game G(n, c) is played. As
noted before, 0 means back-off, and 1 means transmit. Let pi,n
denote the transmission probability of transmitter i when there
are n transmitters contending for the channel access. Also let
Sn represent the total number of packet arrivals when there
are n transmitters contending for the channel access. Note that
Sn =
∑n
i=1X
(n)
i . For a given set N0, |N0| will represent the
cardinality of this set.
C. Nash Equilibria of G(n, c)
The transmission probability vector at which all nodes
back-off with probability one is not a Nash equilibrium of
G(n, c) since any node can obtain positive utility by setting
its transmission probability to a positive number given the fact
that others do not transmit. Therefore, there is an incentive
for nodes to deviate from the strategy profile at which all
of them back-off. As a result, at Nash equilibria of G(n, c),
we expect to observe some of the transmitters transmitting
with some positive probabilities and the remaining back-off
with probability one. To further investigate this point, let pi :⋃∞
n=2Rn+ → R+ be such that for any c ∈
⋃∞
n=2Rn+, pi(c) =∏
i
ci
1+ci
. The following theorem from [4] characterizes the
Nash equilibria of this game.
Theorem 1: Let X(n)i be the action chosen by transmitter
i ∈ N , c ∈ Rn and N0 ⊆ N with 2 ≤ |N0| ≤ n.
Then, G(n, c) has n pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Moreover,
any mixed-strategy profile such that nodes in N0 transmit
with some positive probability, and nodes in N − N0 back-
off with probability 1 is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
P{X(n)i = 1} = 1 − ( 1+cici )(pi(c′))
1
|N0|−1 for i ∈ N0, and
ci
1+ci
(≥)
> pi(c′)
1
|N0|−1 for all i ∈ N (with ≥ if i ∈ N − N0),
where c′ = (ci)i∈N0 .
D. Review: Homogenous Case
We briefly mention the form of the asymptotic distribution
of the total number of packet arrivals when all transmitters
have identical utility functions. In this case, the necessary
and sufficient condition given in Theorem 1 can be satisfied
for any subset N0 of N with |N0| ≥ 2 for proper choice
of the nodes’ transmission probabilities. Therefore, for any
given N0 ⊆ N with |N0| ≥ 2, a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium at which only the transmitters in N0 transmit
with some positive probability, and the rest of them back-off
with probability one exists. At such a Nash equilibrium, the
transmission probabilities of transmitters in N0 are all equal
to p = 1 − ( c1+c) 1|N0|−1 . Thus, transmitters transmit with
probability p = 1 − ( c1+c) 1n−1 at the FMNE. Hence, at the
FMNE of the homogenous random access game, Sn becomes a
binomial random variable with the success probability p = 1−(
c
1+c
) 1
n−1 . Since n·(1−( c1+c) 1n−1 ) approaches to− log ( c1+c)
as n goes to infinity, Sn converges, in distribution, to a Poisson
distribution with mean − log ( c1+c), which can be shown by
using Poisson approximation the binomial distribution ([8]).
Further details can be found in [4]. For the rest of the
paper, our aim is to prove the limit theorem for Sn in the
more general case when nodes do not have identical utility
functions. We first give a counter example showing that the
limiting distribution of Sn cannot always be a pure Poisson
distribution. In this latter case, we then, however, show that
it can be arbitrarily closely approximated in distribution by
a summation of finitely many independent Bernoulli random
variables and a Poisson random variable.
E. Related Work
Two closely related work are [5] and [6]. In these work,
they analyze the performance of Slotted ALOHA protocol with
selfish transmitters by only considering the homogenous case
where selfish nodes have identical utility functions. Moreover,
they do not provide any results regarding the asymptotic packet
arrival distribution. In [4], we mostly focused on the asymp-
totic channel throughput and the asymptotic packet arrival
distribution in the homogenous case for the same problem
set-up. We also provided a weaker necessary condition for the
convergence of packet arrivals in distribution in the heteroge-
neous case. Different from the existing work in the literature,
this paper will concentrate on the asymptotic packet arrival
distribution in the more general case when selfish transmitters
having different utility functions contend for the access of
a common wireless communication channel. We provide a
necessary and sufficient condition for the convergence of total
number of packet arrivals in distribution as the number of
selfish transmitters increases to infinity. We also specify the
form of the asymptotic packet arrival distribution.
II. LIMITING BEHAVIOR OF Sn IN THE HETEROGENOUS
CASE
We start our discussion with an example illustrating that
the Poisson type convergence does not occur in general in
the heterogeneous case. This result, while somewhat negative,
will shed light on the form of the limiting distributions for
Sn. In this example, the limiting distribution of the packet
arrivals will be a mixture of a Poisson distribution and several
Bernoulli distributions.
Example: We consider the FMNE of the one-shot random
access game, and let cn = (M1,M2, . . . ,Ml, 1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−l of them
). By
3Theorem 1, G(n, cn) has an FMNE if and only if the following
conditions are satisfied:
Mi
1 +Mi
>
(
1
2
) n−l
n−1 l∏
j=1
(
Mj
1 +Mj
) 1
n−1
for 1 ≤ i ≤ l, (1)
and
(
1
2
)l−1 >
l∏
j=1
Mj
1 +Mj
for l + 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (2)
Since the right-hand side of (1) approaches to 12 , we must
choose Mi > 1 for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., l} to have the FMNE for
all n large enough. Any choice of M1,M2, . . . ,Ml such that
Mi > 1 for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., l} and
∏l
j=1
Mj
1+Mj
< ( 12 )
l−1
is good for our purposes. One way of choosing such Mi’s
is to make all of the Mi1+Mi ’s smaller than (
1
2 )
l−1
l , which
corresponds to M1,M2, . . . ,Ml ∈
(
1, 1
2
l−1
l −1
)
.
For appropriately chosen Mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ l, we have the
following transmission probabilities:
pi,n = 1− 1+MiMi
(
1
2
) n−l
n−1 ∏l
j=1
(
Mj
1+Mj
) 1
n−1
for 1 ≤ i ≤ l,
and
pi,n = 1− 2
l−1
n−1
∏l
j=1
(
Mj
1+Mj
) 1
n−1
for l + 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Define Yn =
∑n
i=l+1X
(n)
i . Then, Sn =
∑l
i=1X
(n)
i + Yn.
Observe that p(n)max
4
= maxl+1≤i≤n pi,n → 0 and
n∑
i=l+1
pi,n → log(21−l) +
l∑
j=1
log
(
1 +
1
Mj
)
(3)
as n→∞. Therefore,
Yn ⇒ Po
log(21−l) + l∑
j=1
log
(
1 +
1
Mj
) , (4)
X
(n)
i ⇒ Bern
(
1− 1 +Mi
2Mi
)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. (5)
As a result, we conclude, by using the continuity theorem and
the independence of the random variables Yn and X
(n)
i , that
Sn ⇒ Po
(
log(21−l) +
l∑
i=1
log
(
1 +
1
Mi
))
+
l∑
i=1
Bern
(
1− 1 +Mi
2Mi
)
. (6)
One interesting feature of this example is that we cannot
find infinitely many Mi’s that are uniformly bounded away
from 1, since 1
2
l−1
l −1
→ 1 as l → ∞. This observation will
help us in obtaining the asymptotic distribution of Sn in the
heterogeneous case.
For the rest of the paper, we focus on the asymptotic
distribution of Sn at the FMNE of G(n, cn) since the FMNE
is the fairest Nash equilibrium at which all transmitters have
a chance to transmit with some positive probability depending
on their costs of failed transmissions. More general results can
Fig. 2. A pictorial explanation of Theorem 2. The limiting distribution
of Sn lies in a small ball around the distribution of the random variable
Po(λ) +
PK
k=1Bern(pk).
be found in [7]. Set ai = ci1+ci and amin(n) = min1≤i≤n ai.
We will assume that the costs of unsuccessful transmission of
the nodes depend only on their internal parameters such as
remaining battery lifetime or energy spent per transmission.
Therefore, adding new transmitters to the game does not
change the costs of the transmitters already playing the game.
Thus, α = infi≥1 ai = limn→∞ amin(n) is well-defined. The
following two auxiliary results will help in proving the main
theorem, Theorem 2, of the paper. Their proofs can be found
in [4] and [7]. The first one states the convergence of the
geometric mean of the numbers a1, a2, . . . , an to a constant
α > 0 as n→∞ if the FMNE exists for all n ≥ 2. The second
one states the convergence of the ai’s to the same constant α
if the FMNE exists for all n ≥ 2.
Lemma 1: Let Geo(a1, a2, . . . , an) denote the geometric
mean of a1, a2, . . . , an. If the FMNE exists for all n ≥ 2
exists, then limn→∞Geo(a1, . . . , an) = α > 0.
Lemma 2: If the FMNE exists for all n ≥ 2, then
limi→∞ ai = α.
In words, Lemma 2 says that if the FMNE exists for
all n ≥ 2, then we can find a c > 0 such that for any
given δ > 0, the costs of all the transmitters, except for the
finitely many of them, incurred as a result of unsuccessful
transmissions are concentrated in (c− δ, c+ δ). Intuitively, we
anticipate the selfish nodes whose costs lie in (c− δ, c+ δ) to
behave as in the homogeneous case. Thus, the total number
of packet arrivals from these nodes can be approximated by
a Poisson random variable up to an arbitrarily small error
term (δ) depending on δ. The arrivals from the other finitely
many nodes whose costs lie outside of (c − δ, c + δ) can
be given by a summation of finitely many Bernoulli random
variables. Therefore, we expect that once Sn converges in
distribution, for any given  > 0, we should be able to
find a Poisson random variable Po(λ) and finitely many
Bernoulli random variables {Bern(pj)}Kj=1 such that Sn can
be approximated, in variational distance, by the sum of Po(λ)
and {Bern(pj)}Kj=1 up to an error term less than . A pictorial
representation of this fact is given in Fig. 2.
The main result of the paper formally stating the above
observation is given in Theorem 2. In the proof of Theorem
2, we let pi,∞ = limn→∞ pi,n when the FMNE exists for all
n ≥ 2. Existence of this limit can be shown by using Lemma
1.
Theorem 2: Assume FMNE exists for all n ≥ 2. Then, Sn
4converges in distribution if and only if limn→∞
∑n
i=1 pi,n ∈
(0,∞). Moreover, for any  > 0, there exists a Poisson random
variable Po(λ) and a collection of finitely many Bernoulli
random variables {Bern(pk)}Kk=1 such that
lim sup
n→∞
dV
(
Sn, Po(λ) +
K∑
k=1
Bern(pk)
)
≤ . (7)
Proof: ⇐=: We first show the if direction. Suppose
limn→∞
∑n
i=1 pi,n = m ∈ (0,∞) exists. Let mn =∑n
i=1 pi,n and Sn be distributed according to µn. We will
first show that {µn}∞n=1 is a tight sequence of distributions.
To this end, we show that for each  > 0, ∃M ∈ N such that
P{Sn ∈ [0,M ]} ≥ 1− . Choose a δ > 0 and choose N ∈ N
large enough that mn ∈ [m− δ,m+ δ] for all n ≥ N . Then,
by the Markov inequality,
P{Sn > M} ≤
E
[
(Sn −mn)2
]
(M −mn)2 .
We bound E
[
(Sn −mn)2
]
as follows:
E
[
(Sn −mn)2
]
=
n∑
i=1
V ar
(
X
(n)
i
)
≤ mn ≤ m+ δ.
In addition, (M −mn)2 ≥ (M −m− δ)2. Thus,
P{Sn > M} ≤ m+ δ(M −m− δ)2 .
If M is large enough, then we have P{Sn > M} ≤ 
for all n ≥ N . By making M larger, if necessary, we
have P{Sn > M} = 0 for all n < N . As a result,
P {Sn ∈ [0,M ]} > 1 −  for all n. Thus, {µn}∞n=1 is a
tight sequence of distributions. Now, we will show that µn
converges, in variational distance, to a distribution µ. This fact,
combined with tightness of {µn}∞n=1, will imply that µ is in
fact a probability distribution and µn ⇒ µ. By using Lemma 1
and Lemma 2, it can be shown that limi→∞ pi,∞ = 0. Thus,
for any given  > 0, we can choose K large enough that
maxi≥K pi,∞ ≤ 8m .
Let λn =
∑n
i=K pi,n and λ = limn→∞ λn.
Then, by using the properties of variational distance,
dV
(
Sn, Po(λ) +
∑K−1
i=1 Bern(pi,∞)
)
can be bounded above
as
dV
(
Sn, Po(λ) +
K−1∑
i=1
Bern(pi,∞)
)
≤ dV
(
K−1∑
i=1
X
(n)
i ,
K−1∑
i=1
Bern(pi,∞)
)
+ dV (Po(λn), Po(λ)) + 2
n∑
i=K
p2i,n
≤ dV
(
K−1∑
i=1
X
(n)
i ,
K−1∑
i=1
Bern(pi,∞)
)
+ dV (Po(λn), Po(λ)) + 2 max
K≤i≤n
pi,n
n∑
i=K
pi,n.
Thus,
lim sup
n→∞
dV
(
Sn,
K−1∑
i=1
Bern(pi,∞) + Po(λ)
)
≤ 2 lim sup
n→∞
(
λn. max
K≤i≤n
pi,n
)
= 2λ lim sup
n→∞
max
K≤i≤n
pi,n (since λn → λ).
Let i(n) be such that pi(n),n = maxK≤i≤n pi,n. Then, there
exists a subsequence {nk}∞k=1 such that
lim
k→∞
pi(nk),nk = lim sup
n→∞
max
K≤i≤n
pi,n.
If {i(nk)}∞k=1 is a bounded sequence, there exists a further
subsequence {i(nkj}∞j=1 such that limj→∞ i(nkj ) = i∗∗.
Since we are considering a sequence of integers converging
to another integer, there exists N ∈ N such that we have
i(nkj ) = i
∗∗ for all j ≥ N . Thus,
lim sup
n→∞
max
K≤i≤n
pi,n = pi∗∗,∞ ≤ max
i≥K
pi,∞.
If {i(nk)}∞k=1 is not a bounded sequence, then there exists a
further subsequence {i(nkj )}∞j=1 such that limj→∞ i(nkj ) =
∞. Let γn = (
∏n
i=1 ai)
1
n−1 . Observe that transmission prob-
abilities at FMNE can be given as pi,n = 1− a−1i γn. So,
lim sup
n→∞
max
K≤i≤n
pi,n = lim
j→∞
pi(nkj ),nkj
= 1− lim
j→∞
a−1i(nkj )
lim
j→∞
γnkj
= 0 ≤ max
i≥K
pi,∞.
Therefore,
lim sup
n→∞
dV
(
Sn, Po(λ) +
K−1∑
i=1
Bern(pi,∞)
)
≤ 2λmax
i≥K
pi,∞ ≤ 4 .
Thus, ∃N ∈ N large enough so that
dV
(
Sn, Po(λ) +
K−1∑
i=1
Bern(pi,∞)
)
≤ 
2
for all n ≥ N . As a result, we conclude that {µn}∞n=1 is a
Cauchy sequence with respect to the metric dV on the set
of all probability measures Z on Z. This also implies that
{µn(z)}∞n=1 is a Cauchy sequence for all z ∈ Z, and therefore,
converges for any z ∈ Z. Let µ(z) = limn→∞ µn(z) for all
z ∈ Z. This combined with the tightness of {µn}∞n=1 implies
that µ is a probability measure and µn ⇒ µ.
=⇒: Now, we prove the only if part. In fact, this will
be a general result for any sequence of triangular arrays of
Bernoulli random variables. Suppose now that there exists
an R valued random variable S∞ such that Sn converges in
distribution to S∞. First, assume
lim sup
n→∞
mn =∞,
5and let Y (n)i = X
(n)
i − pi,n. Set Rn =
∑n
i=1 Y
(n)
i . Consider
E
[
e−tY
(n)
i
]
for t > 0. We have
E
[
e−tY
(n)
i
]
≤ 1 + 1
2!
t2
∣∣∣E [(Y (n)i )2]∣∣∣+ 13! t3 ∣∣∣E [(Y (n)i )3]∣∣∣+ · · · .
We will show
∣∣∣E[(Y (n)i )k]∣∣∣ ≤ pi,n for all k. For k = 2,
E
[
(Y (n)i )
2
]
= V ar
(
X
(n)
i
)
≤ E
[(
X
(n)
i
)2]
= pi,n.
For any k ≥ 3, we have∣∣∣∣E [(Y (n)i )k]∣∣∣∣
≤
(
E
[∣∣∣Y (n)i ∣∣∣2k−2]) 12 (E [∣∣∣Y (n)i ∣∣∣2]) 12 (Ho¨lder’s Ineq.)
≤
(
E
[∣∣∣Y (n)i ∣∣∣2]) 12 (E [∣∣∣Y (n)i ∣∣∣2]) 12 ≤ pi,n.
Thus,
E
[
e−tY
(n)
i
]
≤ 1 + 1
2!
t2pi,n + pi,n
(
t3
3!
+
t4
4!
+ · · ·
)
. (8)
Then, there is a δ1 > 0 such that, uniformly over all pi,n, we
have
E
[
e−tY
(n)
i
]
≤ 1 + t2pi,n for all t ∈ (0, δ1).
Now, make δ1 smaller (if necessary) so that t2 ≤ t4 . Then, for
t ∈ (0, δ1), we have
P
{
Sn ≤ mn2
}
≤ E
[
e−tRn
]
e
tmn
2
(Markov Inequality)
= e
−tmn
2
n∏
i=1
E
[
e−tY
(n)
i
]
≤ e−tmn2
n∏
i=1
(1 + t2pi,n)
= exp
(
n∑
i=1
(−tpi,n
2
+ log
(
1 + t2pi,n
)))
≤ exp
(
n∑
i=1
(−tpi,n
2
+ t2pi,n
))
(since log(x) ≤ x− 1)
≤ exp
(
−t
4
n∑
i=1
pi,n
)
.
Since lim supn→∞mn = ∞, we can find a subsequence of
{mn}∞n=1, which we call {mn(k)}∞k=1, such that mn(k) ≥ k.
Then, P
{
Sn(k) ≤ mn(k)2
} ≤ exp (−tk4 ). On setting Ak =
{ω ∈ Ω : Sn(k)(ω) ≤ mn(k)2 }, we have
∞∑
k=1
P (Ak) <∞.
By the Borel-Cantelli lemma, P{Ak i.o} = 0. Thus,
limk→∞ Sn(k) = ∞ w.p.1. Since almost sure convergence
implies convergence in distribution, we have S∞ =∞ w.p.1,
which is a contradiction. Thus, lim supn→∞mn <∞. In this
case, we can find C <∞ such that mn ≤ C for all n. Now,
we will show that {Sn}∞n=1 is uniformly integrable.
E
[
S2n
]
= E
[
n∑
i=1
(
X
(n)
i
)2]
+ E
 n∑
i,j=1
i6=j
X
(n)
i X
(n)
j

≤
n∑
i=1
pi,n +
n∑
i,j=1
pi,npj,n
= mn +m2n ≤ C (1 + C) <∞.
Therefore, {Sn}∞n=1 is uniformly integrable. By Skoro-
hod’s representation theorem, there exists a probability space
(Ω′,F ′, P ′) and random variables S′n and S′∞ having the same
distributions as Sn and S∞, respectively, such that S′n → S′∞
w.p.1. By uniform integrability, we also have L1 convergence,
i.e.,
lim
n→∞E [S
′
n] = E [S′∞] . (9)
Therefore, limn→∞mn exists and belongs to (0,∞).
III. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed the asymptotic behavior of
multiple-access networks containing large numbers of selfish
transmitters that share a common wireless communication
channel to communicate with their intended receivers. In
particular, we have focused on the asymptotic distribution of
the total number of packet arrivals to the common wireless
channel coming from these selfish transmitters. When selfish
transmitters are identical to one another in their utility func-
tions, we have shown that the asymptotic distribution of the
total number of packet arrivals becomes equal to a Poisson
distribution. On the other hand, when selfish transmitters do
not have identical utility functions, we have first obtained
a necessary and sufficient condition for the total number
of packet arrivals to converge in distribution. We then have
shown that the asymptotic packet arrival distribution can be
arbitrarily closely approximated in distribution by a summation
of finitely many independent Bernoulli random variables and
an independent Poisson random variable.
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